Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ICEPP Working Papers

International Center for Public Policy

6-30-2021

The Effect of Crises on Fiscal and Political Recentralization:
Large-Panel Evidence
Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza
World Bank, gcanavire@gmail.com

Pablo Evia Salas
trAndeS, pablo.evia@daad-alumni.de

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Georgia State University, jorgemartinez@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Canavire-Bacarreza, Gustavo; Evia Salas, Pablo; and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, "The Effect of Crises on
Fiscal and Political Recentralization: Large-Panel Evidence" (2021). ICEPP Working Papers. 106.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp/106

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the International Center for Public Policy at
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEPP Working Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

International Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 21-11
June 2021

The Effect of Crises on Fiscal and Political
Recentralization: Large-Panel Evidence
Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza
Pablo Evia Salas
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

International Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 21-11

The Effect of Crises on Fiscal and Political
Recentralization: Evidence from a Large Panel of
Countries

Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza
Pablo Evia Salas
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
June
2021

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
United States of America
Phone: (404) 413-0235
Fax: (404) 651-4449
Email: paulbenson@gsu.edu
Website: http://icepp.gsu.edu/
Copyright 2021, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the copyright owner.

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with
the objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public
policy. In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the
Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including
the International Center for Public Policy.
The mission of the International Center for Public Policy (ICePP) at the Andrew Young School
of Policy Studies is to provide academic and professional training, applied research, and
technical assistance in support of sound public policy and sustainable economic growth in
developing and transitional economies.
ICePP is recognized worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms
through technical assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built
serving a diverse client base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance
ministries, government organizations, legislative bodies, and private sector institutions.
The success of ICePP reflects the breadth and depth of its in-house technical expertise. The
Andrew Young School's faculty are leading experts in economics and public policy and have
authored books, published in major academic and technical journals, and have extensive
experience in designing and implementing technical assistance and training programs.
Andrew Young School faculty have been active in policy reform in over 40 countries around
the world. Our technical assistance strategy is not merely to provide technical prescriptions for
policy reform, but to engage in a collaborative effort with host governments and donor
agencies to identify and analyze the issues at hand, arrive at policy solutions, and implement
reforms.
ICePP specializes in four broad policy areas:
 Fiscal policy (e.g., tax reforms, public expenditure reviews)
 Fiscal decentralization (e.g., reform, intergovernmental transfer systems, urban finance)
 Budgeting and fiscal management (e.g., local, performance-based, capital, and multiyear
budgeting)
 Economic analysis and revenue forecasting (e.g., micro-simulation, time series forecasting)
For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please
visit our website at http://icepp.gsu.edu or contact us by email at paulbenson@gsu.edu.

The Effect of Crises on Fiscal and Political Recentralization:
Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries *
Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza †, Pablo Evia Salas ‡, and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez §
June 2021

Abstract

Economic stability plays a key role in any fiscal and political decentralization process. In the
face of financial and economic shocks, when revenues and expenditures are reduced, countries
may decide to gather resources at the central level—creating a recentralization scenario—or
may take away devolved powers and centralize political institutions. Using data for 75
countries, we examine the effects of economic crisis on fiscal and political decentralization.
We find that several types of crises lead to fiscal recentralization; only in the case of domestic
borrowing crises is the effect further revenue decentralization, probably reflecting the central
government’s willingness to empower subnational governments to avoid similar crises in the
future. In addition, we explore the effects of economic crisis on political decentralization and
find that they are concordant to the fiscal decentralization effects, suggesting an alignment of
effects along political and fiscal dimensions of subnational autonomy. We also examine
whether economic crises trigger more permanent, rather than just transitory, changes in the
level of decentralization. We generally find more long-lasting effects in the case of fiscal
decentralization measured from the expenditure side. This pattern is very apparent in the cases
of inflation and banking crises and less clear but still present in the cases of currency and
external debt crisis. The main results are robust to different specifications, estimation methods,
and measurements of decentralization.
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1. Introduction
Over the past several decades, decentralization has been a trend that has taken over the
world, with several distinct features across countries. There is no conclusive evidence regarding
the causes or extent of decentralization. Some authors relate a high degree of decentralization to a
higher income or urbanization (Letelier, 2005; Panizza, 1999), to other economic variables such
as trade openness and income inequality, or to other fundamental country traits such as population
and area size, ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity, or geographic fragmentation (Kee, 1977;
Pommerehne, 1977). Some decentralization processes occur after political crises while others
come from external forces and donor programs (Glimeus & Bustad, 2011) or even because of
improvements in the accountability and transparency of local governments (Bos, 2012).
Whatever its causes, decentralization has been found to offer a number of benefits. Through
decentralization, policymakers have realized efficiency gains, reduced in operational costs, and
improved public sector performance in service delivery because of higher responsiveness and
accountability of subnational officials. Decentralization has enhanced democracy and likely
decreased the risk of secession (keeping unity within a country); even in times of crisis, these
dynamics may be expected to translate into policymakers being able to find better-adapted and
possibly more cost-effective solutions (de Mello, Jr., 2000; Martínez-Vázquez, Lago-Peñas, &
Sacchi, 2017).
Despite those virtues and advantages, decentralization also presents some potential
weaknesses or disadvantages. Perhaps the most entrenched one is that decentralization may
weaken the ability of central governments to implement macro stabilization fiscal policies.
Economic stabilization policies, which are needed in situations of high levels of inflation, high
volatility of gross domestic product as a consequence of exogenous shocks, and unmanageable
debt levels, are central government responsibilities, with little role to be played by subnational
1

governments. Furthermore, fiscal stabilization policies typically need to coordinate with other
macroeconomic policies such as monetary policies and exchange rates, functions that are also
assigned at the central government (Ter-Minassian, 2009). In addition, some authors argue that
under certain conditions (e.g., weak central bureaucracies or deep cultural divisions),
decentralization could hamper efforts at macroeconomic stabilization and other economic reforms
and potentially facilitate national fragmentation (Treisman, 1999).
Whether fiscal decentralization is actually harmful to the attainment of macroeconomic
stability is still very open to debate. Most recent studies seem to indicate that they key lies in the
design of the fiscal decentralization system (Baskaran, 2010; Lago-Peñas, Martinez-Vazquez, &
Sacchi, 2020; Neyapti, 2013). Regardless of what the actual impact of fiscal decentralization is on
the ability of central governments to conduct macro stabilization policies, the important related
question remains of whether, in practice, decentralized countries in times of fiscal crisis do actually
take measures to recentralize the country fiscally and politically, reducing the effective level of
decentralization. Could the impact of the 2008 Great Recession or the COVID-19 Pandemic of
2020 be the catalyst of a changing trend toward centralization? While there have been past studies
on fiscal decentralization trends (e.g., Bartolini, Sacchi, Salotti, & Santolini, 2018), little work has
been done on the relationships between fiscal and political decentralization and economic crisis,
especially at the international level. There is little evidence on the durability or permanence of
crisis-induced changes in decentralization; this study fills that vacuum in the literature.
We use data for 75 countries to explore the effects of diverse types of economic crisis on
fiscal and political decentralization. We find that several types of crisis do lead to fiscal
recentralization, while domestic borrowing crises are associated with further revenue
decentralization. The effect of crises on political decentralization are in line with fiscal
2

decentralization, suggesting there is a correspondence between those two dimensions of
subnational autonomy. In the paper, we also explore how durable or permanent those crisis-induced
institutional changes are. We find a prevalence of permanent shocks (i.e., no reversion from
recentralization) in the case of fiscal decentralization measured from the expenditure side. This
pattern is apparent in the case of the inflation and banking crises and less robust but still present
when we consider currency and external debt crises.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: in section two, we review the previous
literature regarding decentralization and economic crisis; section three describes the data and
lays out our estimation methodology; the empirical results are discussed in section four; section
five discusses permanent versus transitory shocks; section six covers robustness checks; and the
final section concludes with an overview of the findings and potential future directions of the
research.
2. Where Do We Stand? A Brief Review of the Literature
Loosely speaking, “decentralization” refers to the devolution of power from the central
governments to lower levels of government. It often involves a fiscal dimension in which the
central government hands down expenditure responsibilities and tax and other revenue resources
to subnational levels. Fiscal decentralization on the expenditures side sees more functional
responsibilities and expenditures realized by subnational governments and on the revenue side
includes more taxes assigned and collected at subnational levels as well as transfers received by
the subnational governments. From a political dimension, decentralization can also involve a
devolution or reallocation of power from the central to the local or regional governments, aiming
to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in public decision-making. The two
aspects, fiscal and political, often move together but need not always do so. We have seen that
several determinants of decentralization have been identified in the literature raging from income
3

level to size of geography. However, much less is known about why countries may switch gears
and recentralize. As Friedrich (1968) has noted, fiscally decentralized systems are dynamic in
nature, always changing and evolving in response to political and economic forces—including
economic crises. Generally speaking, countries that decentralize do not always remain
decentralized; for example, Bos (2012) describes the significant ups and downs of the Netherlands
as a decentralized country over the centuries. What may be the causes behind recentralization?
One simple possibility is the reversal in trends of some of the very variables that have been found
to be significant determinants of decentralization 1. However, the very nature of most, if not all, of
those variables makes each an unlikely source of recentralization. Alternatively, there are select
cases in which substantial recentralization may be due to correcting some perceived major flaws
in design. This was the case in China in 1994, where considerable centralization of revenue sources
took place when the central government perceived that the provinces were not fairly collecting and
sharing revenues upwards with the central government (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). Another
noted example, which did not correct but actually caused a large increase in vertical fiscal
imbalances, is the 1978 “Pacto Fiscal” in Mexico, where state governments agreed to cede most
of their tax autonomous sources to the federal government in exchange for transfers and revenue
sharing (Cabrera-Castellanos & Lozano-Cortes, 2008)
Another potential source of recentralization pressures are exogenous shocks to the system
of intergovernmental relations. This dynamic sometimes appears in the case of new discovery of
oil resources in a country. Using a dataset of 77 countries over the period 1970–2012,
Bhattacharyya et al. (2017) find that oil resource discovery (and not minerals) is a main driver of

Some of the variables found to increase decentralization are population size, ethnic heterogeneity, income
inequality, trade openness or geographical fragmentation.

1
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recentralization, but that this effect is moderated by democratization.
Finally, Bos (2012) identifies, in the case of the Netherlands, the “deterioration of
economic and political circumstances” as a main cause for recentralization, which we may simply
term “crises.” In this paper, we focus on the potential role of much more general (across multiple
countries) external shock: global economic and financial crises. As Bordo and James (2011) note,
institutional developments in fiscal federalism are most often driven by exceptional events and
deep crises such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, which led significant fiscal centralization
processes in five federal countries they studied (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Germany, and the
United States).
While the existing literature does not have a lot to say about the effects of crises on fiscal
and political decentralization, we can still identify some previous studies exploring several
channels through which economic crisis can affect decentralization levels (Fedelino, 2008;
Martinez-Vazquez & Smoke, 2011). First, there are the direct effects of crises, such as decline of
tax bases (e.g., falls in asset prices and economic activity), decline in tax compliance, upward
pressure on cyclically sensitive expenditure programs, and also some more specialized
consequences, such as pressure to bailout enterprises and banks, increases in interest payments,
loss of market access, and so on.. How these direct effects of crises affect measured fiscal
decentralization levels will depend on the overall composition effects; while tax bases will
decrease for both the central and subnational governments and cyclically sensitive expenditure
programs will likewise increase for both, the changes in revenue and expenditure decentralization
measures will be affected by the relative size of the changes at the subnational and central levels.
However, it is central government discretionary fiscal policy measures, which may be
considered indirect effects of the crisis, that are likely to affect the greatest number of subnational
5

governments and the overall level of decentralization. After all, fiscal decentralization is often
perceived, especially in ministries of finance, as a potential impediment for conducting macro
stabilization policies (de Mello, 2000; Lago-Peñas et al., 2020). The indirect effects of a crisis will
include losses of shared revenues and equalization funds resulting from automatic stabilizers and
formula-driven determination of the pool of funds to be allocated, from discretionary tax cuts and
the centralization of some tax sources, and/or from the weakened tax enforcement at the central
government level. Conditional transfers from the central government may also decrease as part of
discretionary actions by the central authorities or simply as another automatic response to funding
mechanisms and revenue sharing rules that are based on current central revenue collections. Given
the significant vertical fiscal imbalances (or, equivalently, the transfer dependence) that most
decentralized systems exhibit, these measures are likely to have an important impact on the
centralization of public expenditures. Recentralizing measures will vary depending on the history
and relative successes and failures of the fiscal decentralization system in each country, but crises
may offer the opportunity to redress some perceived design issues. The final outcome is likely to
vary depending on the severity of the downturn in different regions, the structure of subnational
debt, the structure of own and shared revenues of subnational governments, the extent of
subnational responsibility for more cyclically-sensitive expenditures, and the nature and extent of
central government support (Ter-Minassian, 2009). National governments may also hand the
burden of fiscal adjustment down to subnational levels in times of fiscal stress (Ahrend et al.,
2014). Political destabilization from increased autonomy of regions within the country may be
perceived as another potential downside of decentralization from a political perspective (Glimeus
& Bustad, 2011) and economic crises may be taken as an opportunity to address that issue.
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3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
In this section of the paper, we empirically revisit the explanatory power of economic crises
and select other factors on recentralization processes in both fiscal and political dimensions and
how durable or permanent those changes are. The sources of data for our analysis are the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), government finance statistics (GFS) (which was used to create
the fiscal decentralization measures), the Reinhart-Rogoff economic crisis data, the polity IV
index, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project data, and the World Development Indicators
(which provides us with information such as child mortality and world population).
As discussed by Panizza (1999) and Oates (1972), among many others, the main problem
when empirically examining decentralization is finding a method to quantify the activity of local
governments that results from autonomous expenditure decision-making and own-tax revenue
raising. In practice, the data available do not allow us to measure true levels of autonomy,
especially at a cross-country level. Instead, in the estimations we use the standard measures of
fiscal decentralization (following Pryor (1968), Oates (1972), Panizza (1999), and MartinezVazquez and Timofeev (2009) among many others). We define decentralization ratios as the
percentage of revenues and expenditures of the subnational governments to the total revenues and
expenditures of the public sector from 1960 to 2007.
In addition to the main measures described above, we incorporate other determinants of
fiscal decentralization that have consistently been found to play a significant role in the previous
literature. Several studies have examined the main determinants of fiscal decentralization using a
fairly consistent set of variables. One of the most-used variables is a proxy for development.
Decentralization may itself be “a superior good, the demand for which is likely to grow with per
capita income” (Tanzi, 2000). As people become richer, more educated, and more urbanized, they
7

may have more time and greater motivation to participate in making local political decisions. They
may also become more skilled at organizing to pressure the central government to devolve
authority and fiscal resources. Increases in development may also induce a shift in tastes towards
public goods and services that are most efficiently provided locally. Bahl and Nath (1986), Letellier
(2005), Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009), and Desai et al. (2005) find a positive relationship
between economic development and fiscal decentralization. However, this result is not conclusive:
Oates (1972) finds a negative relation of economic development and fiscal decentralization and
Panizza (1999) finds that the effect differs when outliers are excluded from the analysis. This
complexity calls for the inclusion of one or more proxies for economic development in our
analysis; therefore, we include GDP per capita and infant mortality in the controls.
As Alesina and Spalaore (1997), along with Triesman (2006), argue, institutional variables
play a key role in the design of the state. In this line of reasoning, another set of empirical studies
of the determinants of decentralization also include the extent of democracy as a control variable
but results tend to be ambiguous. Some have suggested there is a natural affinity between political
rights and decentralization; political participation at the local level might educate citizens in
democratic practices and would push for higher levels of political rights. At the same time, strong
local governments might serve as a check on abusive central authorities and would push for better
social controls. In this sense, less corrupt countries would push for stronger local governments,
implying higher levels of fiscal decentralization. Indeed, across Eastern Europe, the collapse of
regimes in which power was centralized in the communist party prompted strong demand for
autonomous local self-government (World Bank, 2001). Accordingly, we include controls such as
a measure of political rights and a corruption index in the analysis to control for institutional
support of the state.
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Panizza (1999), Letellier (2005), and Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) argue that
ethnic fractionalization captures changes in the preferences of individuals; therefore, this argument
is an economic efficiency one, since tastes for public goods and services are likely to vary across
ethnic groups. Triesman (2006) sets an additional argument towards the inclusion of ethnic
variables based on practical politics. He argues that where ethnic divisions are politicized (and
ethnic groups are territorially compact), decentralizing authority over such contentious policy
issues as education and culture may help to restrain communal violence or even prevent civil war.
To be credible, policy decentralization must have some fiscal component. Thus, to preserve
stability, central elites in more ethnically divided societies may choose a higher level of fiscal
decentralization. Of course, they also may not. Central leaders may care more about other goals—
retaining fiscal resources at the center, for instance—than about avoiding communal violence.
Moreover, even if they do decentralize, this may fail to prevent ethnic violence or to preempt
demands for secession.
Regarding the crisis variables employed in the paper, we rely on the Reinhart-Rogoff
(2010) dataset. The authors built an annual crisis dataset spanning 1800 to 2010 with information
on a variety of economic crises such as banking, currency, domestic and external default or
restructuring, and inflation for 70 countries. In order to match this data to the decentralization
dataset (GFS), we use the crisis dataset from the year 1970 to 2010.
The corruption variable is a composite index of the perceived level of corruption. This
indicator is constructed as a Bayesian index that relies on data from well-known sources, such as
the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) and the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (World Bank). The construction of the index and its main characteristics are described
in Standaert (2015). Regarding our instruments for the 2SLS strategy, the exchange rate regime
9

comes from Ilzetzki et al. (2017) while the short-term liabilities proportion is derived using
information from the IMF.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Typically, we observe a high correlation between economic development and fiscal
decentralization: on average, more developed nations present higher levels of fiscal
decentralization and have also been exposed to a higher number of crisis episodes (see Table 1).
Table 1: Decentralization Levels, 1970-2016
Average percentage of total Average percentage of
Crisis
total revenues for
expenditures for
Income Level
subnational governments subnational governments episodes
Lower
14.53
12.54
148
Lower-Middle
20.39
13.96
448
Upper-Middle
20.13
12.15
363
High-Income, non-OECD
12.81
11.07
-(**)
581
33.38
20.90
High-Income, OECD
Source: Own elaboration, from IMF Fiscal Decentralization Dataset, OECD World Observatory
on Subnational Spending and Finance (expenditures and revenues), and Harvard’s Behavioral
Finance and Financial Stability. (**): It is not that there were no crises in high-income nonOECD countries. We are simply missing information about crisis episodes in these countries:
Cyprus, Israel, Malta, Slovenia, and UAE.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of all the variables for the estimation of our models.
Because the data comes from different non-uniform sources, there is some variability in the years
available for some variables depending on the country. For OECD countries, older information
regarding the degree of decentralization is available, while for emergent and developing countries,
this availability is more limited. In this sense, given the information available, the time span of the
panel runs from 1970 to 2010.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Average
Local revenues
Local expenditures
Currency crisis
Inflation crisis
Stock market crisis
Banking crisis
Domestic debt crisis
External debt crisis
Crisis episodes
Any crisis dummy
GDPpc (log)
Population MM (log)
Polity IV Index
Mortality(log)
Primary enrollment rate

Source: Own elaboration

16.62
25.50
0.18
0.12
0.27
0.17
0.02
0.10
0.77
0.35
9.30
2.40
4.68
2.84
101.71

SD

Min

Max

13.42 0.04 89.22
16.20 0.18 81.36
0.38
0
1
0.32
0
1
0.45
0
1
0.38
0
1
0.15
0
1
0.30
0
1
0.99
0
6
0.48
0
1
1.06 6.58 12.41
1.66 -1.59 7.20
6.95
-10
10
0.99 0.64
5.33
11.80 17.31 165.65

In Table 2, we can see that decentralization from the expenditures side is slightly higher
than from the revenue side. However, as we have panel data, the summary statistics conceal
potentially higher variability in the data. Concerning the information related to the different types
of crises, the information in Table 1 shows that the stock market crisis is the most prevailing among
them, followed closely by inflation and banking crisis. On average, 71% of the countries have
suffered at least one crisis during the period covered by the sample (1970 – 2010), which may
seem a high percentage but is in line with the figures declared in Reinhart (2010). We further
explore the geographical pattern of decentralization and crisis in Figures 1, 2, and 3.
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Figure 1. Fiscal Decentralization (Revenues)
1970’s

2010’s
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Figure 2. Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditures)
1970’s

2010’s
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Figure 3. Accumulated Crisis Episodes

3.3 Methodology
In order to identify the relationship between crisis and fiscal/political decentralization, we
aim to estimate the following equation:
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷 ⋅ 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

where "fiscal decentralization" is measured by the proportion of expenditures or revenues
transferred/earned by local governments to the total government expenditures and revenues,
respectively; “political decentralization” is measured using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
dataset (Coppedge, 2020). Specifically, we used the following variables as potential proxies to
political decentralization:
•

Regional government index: “Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to
what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional
level?”

•

Local government index: “Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what
extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?”

14

“Crisis” is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a specific type of crisis (inflation, exchange
rate, sovereign debt, domestic debt, stock exchange, or banking) has been observed in the country
i and year t.
In order to get a sense of the direction of the main variables (i.e., fiscal/political
decentralization and crisis), we first rely on calculating simple correlations (without covariates).
While regressions without controls do not give a good or complete picture of the true link between
two variables, we first looked at these relationships in order to explore the data and get a sense of
the magnitude and direction of the potential effect of crisis on decentralization. For all of our
comparisons, both fiscal decentralization in expenditures and fiscal decentralization in revenues
are analyzed. This comparison gives a general idea of what to expect when controls are added and
show how the results can vary dependent on the type of crisis. We then run the regressions with
controls, which were chosen based on what we thought could affect a government's decision to
decentralize in addition to typical controls such as GDP and population.
Furthermore, to the estimation of equation (1) using panel data fixed-effects model
(assuming both country and year- fixed effects-FE), we explore the use of instrumental variables
(specifically, a 2SLS strategy), in order to overcome the potential bias remainder of the F.E. model.
In specific, we estimate the following equations:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝜷𝜷𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 + 𝑢𝑢_𝑖𝑖

𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜹𝜹𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈_𝑖𝑖

(2)
(3)

in which Z represents a valid instrument for our "crisis" variable.

15

0.1

Figure 4: Correlations Between Type of Crisis and Fiscal/Political Decentralization
Revenue

Expenditure

0.05
0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
-0.2

Currency
crisis(**)

Inflation
crisis(***)

Stock Market Domestic External debt Banking crisis
Crisis
Crisis
Crisis
debt crisis(**) crisis(***)
episodes(*) Dummy(***)

0.15

REGELEC

0.1

LOCELEC

0.05
0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
-0.2
-0.25
-0.3
-0.35

Currency
crisis(***)

Inflation
crisis(***)

Source: Own elaboration.

Stock Market Domestic debt External debt
crisis(***)
crisis(***)
crisis(***)

Banking Crisis episodes Crisis dummy
crisis(***)
(***)
(***)

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

As Figure 4 shows, external debt and inflation crises episodes are those that show the
strongest correlation with the level of decentralization. As one would expect, the sign of this
correlation is negative, which means that the occurrence of these types of crisis triggers a
recentralization of expenditures and revenues (a decrease in the level of decentralization).
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Currency crises are also associated with a decreasing level of decentralization. Additionally,
statistically significant effects are observed when the number of crisis episodes and a crisis dummy
(which takes the value of one if any type of crisis is observed and zero otherwise) are taken into
account, with the expected effect on the level of decentralization (i.e., a negative effect). With
respect to political decentralization, excepting stock market and banking crises, there seems to be
a negative and statistically significant correlation between both proxies of political decentralization
and the occurrence of an economic crisis. The strongest relationships are those regarding debt
episodes (both domestic and external).
As one of the archetypical categories of crisis, we expect to see an inflation crisis have a
negative correlation with decentralization. Latin America has experienced around 282 inflation
crises from 1950 to 2004. During times of high inflation, it is sensible that the central government
will pull back funds from subnational governments. Central governments need to take quick action
when an inflation crisis arises before hyperinflation or a currency crisis can occur. Inflation crises
are combated by curbing spending and central banks must raise interest rates to garner investment
and discourage debt. As the previous literature has emphasized, strong subnational governments
pose a threat in unstable times, especially if they rely on transfers from the central government.
The central government will not want to risk subnational deficits, thus another reason for the
negative correlation. In addition to the inflation crisis, the external debt crisis and currency crisis
show the strongest correlations when considering decentralization from either the revenues or
expenditures side.
It is interesting to note that the correlation of domestic debt and banking crisis with revenue
and expenditure decentralization is positive, in contrast with other types of crises. In particular,
domestic debt crises are often related to the default of subnational governments in their debt and
17

often involve the subsequent rescue or bail out of those subnational governments by the central or
federal authorities—as was the case in Argentina and Brazil over several of the last decades of the
twentieth century. In these cases, the response of the central/federal authorities may be to
accompany the measures of the bail out with empowering subnational government with additional
revenue autonomy so to avoid similar situations of insolvency in the future. The importance of this
observation is that not all crises may lead to recentralization. As is logical in the case of subnational
debt crises, the result would seem to be greater decentralization on the revenue side.
After exploring these correlations, we aim to exploit the panel structure of the dataset in
order to account for unobserved effects by country and by year. This strategy gives us some
advantages in the form of the inclusion of unobserved fixed effects that could be correlated with
the error terms in the regressions. However, one fundamental assumption of this approach is that
these fixed effects are constant in time, an assumption that is difficult to test. In order to overcome
this strong assumption, we later use an IV methodology in order to get rid of the potential
endogeneity between crisis and decentralization.
4. Results
As mentioned above, the results of pooled OLS estimation could be biased if we do not
consider the panel data dimension of the model. In this sense, we estimate a panel data fixedeffects model, in which the fixed effect corresponds to each country of our sample. Hence, it
absorbs all the unobservable factors that are constant in time, but that vary country to country, and
that could be correlated with our covariates. Table 3 shows the results of the F.E. model using the
fiscal and political decentralization variables, and considering only country fixed effects, and both
country and year fixed effects.
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Table 3: Results from the F.E. Model
Expenditures
-0.0049 -0.0020
Currency crisis
(0.0060) (0.0074)
-0.0160 -0.0193
Inflation crisis
(0.0108) (0.0147)
-0.0009 -0.0074
Stock market crisis
(0.0052) (0.0077)
-0.0146* -0.0126
Banking crisis
(0.0074) (0.0078)
0.0017
0.0011
Domestic debt crisis
(0.0194) (0.0191)
-0.0290 -0.0115
External debt crisis
(0.0185) (0.0178)
-0.0071** -0.0069*
Crisis episodes
(0.0032) (0.0037)
-0.0118** -0.0084
Crisis dummy
(0.0054) (0.0060)
Yes
Yes
Controls
Yes
Yes
Country Fixed effects
No
Yes
Year Fixed effects

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Revenues
-0.0047
-0.0024
(0.0067) (0.0068)
-0.0051
-0.0061
(0.0155) (0.0157)
0.0026
0.0031
(0.0046) (0.0059)
-0.0021
-0.0007
(0.0058) (0.0058)
0.0487*** 0.0460***
(0.0132) (0.0151)
0.0145
0.0221
(0.0184) (0.0177)
-0.0002
0.0007
(0.0029) (0.0029)
-0.0031
-0.0013
(0.0048) (0.0046)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Regional Govt Index
-0.0020
0.0049
(0.0217) (0.0197)
-0.0584
-0.0548
(0.0504) (0.0515)
-0.0189
-0.0280
(0.0158) (0.0197)
-0.0027
0.0073
(0.0262) (0.0248)
-0.0232
-0.0064
(0.0486) (0.0487)
-0.0298
-0.0117
(0.0708) (0.0683)
-0.0141
-0.0116
(0.0156) (0.0167)
-0.0023
0.0089
(0.0227) (0.0215)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Local Govt Index
0.0124 0.0215*
(0.0117) (0.0126)
-0.0464* -0.0340
(0.0263) (0.0335)
-0.0112 -0.0176
(0.0100) (0.0135)
-0.0229 -0.0112
(0.0136) (0.0145)
-0.0128 0.0135
(0.0422) (0.0427)
-0.0227 -0.0050
(0.0454) (0.0488)
-0.0100 -0.0065
(0.0080) (0.0100)
-0.0054 0.0071
(0.0119) (0.0139)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

The F.E. model using the decentralization variable from the expenditure side implies a
statistically significant relationship with the banking crisis dummy, with the number of crisis
episodes, and with the crisis dummy (not considering year fixed effects). The sign of the
relationship is as anticipated (negative) and implies a recentralization between 1 and 2 percentage
points. The effect regarding the crisis episodes and the crisis dummy are weaker and imply
marginal effects of less than one percentage point. Interestingly, the fixed-effects specification
implies again a positive coefficient regarding the domestic debt crisis, as compared with the simple
correlation (OLS). As we mentioned above, this could reflect the central government willingness
to empower subnational governments, perhaps with increased revenue autonomy or other types of
self-determination to avoid similar crisis in the future.
With respect to our political decentralization variables, there is not a clear pattern that we
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could distinguish from the regressions. While all the results using the regional government index
are statistically non-significant, the local government index regressions show diverging effects
concerning only the currency and inflation crisis.
4.1 IV Model
The model showed so far neglects that the relationship between decentralization and crisis
(whatever its nature) could be endogenous: while crisis affects decentralization, the contrary could
also be possible. For example, decentralization reform would trigger an economic crisis because
the central government in a decentralized country now receives less revenue. In addition, the
reform itself could be costly, and, in a situation of financial fragility, it could cause fiscal
difficulties or an inflationary spiral. In that sense, we take this potential endogeneity into account
by estimating an IV model with our sample. We rely on two types of instruments: the exchange
rate regime and the country's short-term liabilities share. The rationale is that a fixed exchange rate
regime would make it difficult for a country to solve their balance-of-payments crisis via an
exchange rate depreciation. On the other hand, a high share of short-term liabilities would imply
that a country is more vulnerable to capital flights, which in turn might unchain a different type of
crisis.
Exchange rate regimes that are fixed or close to fixed have been considered as more prone
to a crisis than their more flexible counterparts. For example, Bubula and Ötker (2003) consider
them "… susceptible to speculative attacks and devaluations, and the intensity and scope of the
crisis episodes have called into question the viability of these regimes in a world of highly
integrated international capital markets."
A seminal paper regarding exchange rate regimes and its relationship with crises also
mentions that the picking of such a scheme (in particular, a soft peg) could be related to the
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likelihood of a financial crisis (Calvo & Reinhart, 2002, p. 379). Maintaining a hard peg is
considerably difficult, with a median duration of one year (Bubula & Ötker, 2003). Other authors
consider that, in order to prevent currency crises, countries should apply either full floating or
completely fixed exchange regimes (Edwards, Cavallo, Fraga, & Frenkel, 2003). There is evidence
that pegged regimes could be more subject to speculative attacks, making them more prone to
crises (Bubula & Ötker, 2003).
Table 4 shows the results of the IV model using an instrument based on the exchange rate
regime of the country. We create several dummy variables according to the exchange rate regime
(making a total of five dummy variables to avoid the dummy variable trap). The results regarding
the fiscal decentralization using this instrument are shown in Table 4. While the estimated
coefficients have the expected negative sign, the F-statistic from the first stage is insufficient to
satisfy the rule of thumb of F-stat>10. Indeed, only the coefficient corresponding to the inflation
crisis is statistically significant and, at the same time, accompanied by a non-weak instrument from
the first-stage results. The coefficients corresponding to the banking crisis and domestic debt crisis
are significant, but the instrument associated with its estimation is weak. The magnitude of the
estimated coefficients varies from 1 to 5 percentage points. Interestingly, the results from the fiscal
decentralization specification (expenditures’ side) are quite similar to the results for our political
decentralization proxies (regional government index), reinforcing the idea that economic crises
could cause “recentralization” with respect to the political dimension of decentralization. This is
especially true when the domestic debt crisis, banking crisis, number of crises episodes, and crisis
dummy are considered as factors behind recentralization. On the other hand, a higher level of
government (in this case the regional government, compared to the local government) seems to be
more responsive to the different types of economic crises in terms of recentralization of political
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authority.
Table 4: Results from the FE-IV Model, using Exchange Rate Regime Dummy Instrument
Expenditures
IV
F-stat
Currency
-0.0289**
15.6
Inflation
-0.0412*** 28.691
Stock
-0.2105 0.681
Banking
-0.0759*** 4.412
Domestic debt
-1.2993 0.606
External debt -0.2132*** 4.336
Crisis episodes -0.0211*** 19.287
Crisis dummy -0.0746*** 17.307
Country F.E.
Yes
Controls
Yes
Crisis Type

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Revenues
Regional Govt Index
Local Govt Index
IV
F-stat
IV
F-stat
IV
F-stat
0.0016 15.476
-0.0433
27.028 -0.0384
29.159
-0.0027 26.332
-0.0615
56.689 -0.0318
69.923
-0.0582
0.764
0.1171
1.943 -0.2826**
1.946
-0.0043
4.075 -0.1458*
6.156 -0.0482
5.207
-0.2068
0.525
0.2815
2.191 1.0439**
2.204
-0.036
5.308 -0.1708**
12.22 -0.0199
11.279
-0.0023
20.12 -0.0248*
43.352 -0.0119
42.1
-0.0111
17.25 -0.0780*
31.979 -0.0372
33.826
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

5. Permanent Versus Transitory Shocks: Reversion of Recentralization
Our IV estimation results using an exchange rate regime dummy as an instrument showed
that the effect of economic crises on fiscal decentralization resulted in reduced decentralization (at
least from the expenditure side). However, a relevant question to ask in this context is how
permanent these changes are.
To further investigate whether the effect of economic crises in reducing decentralization is
permanent or transitory, we make use of a Panel Vector Autoregression model (PVAR) to estimate
the impulse-response functions of a shock from a determinate type of crisis and its effect on the
reduction (or increase) in decentralization levels, and most importantly, whether this effect tends
to be permanent or transitory.
VAR models, well established in applied macroeconomics, have been increasingly used in
applied research to capture the dynamic interdependencies present in the data; in particular, shock
identification can transform these reduced-form models into structural ones, allowing impulse
response analyses or policy counterfactuals, among others (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2013).
We estimated the impulse-response functions (IRF) of the different types of crises on our
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fiscal decentralization indicator (both from the expenditure and revenue sides). The pattern that
emerges is the prevalence of permanent shocks (i.e., no reversion from recentralization) in the case
of fiscal decentralization measured from the expenditure side. This pattern is apparent in the case
of the inflation and banking crises and less clear but still present when we consider the currency
and external debt crisis.
A potential explanation of these results would be that the expenditure recentralization is
persistent due to the central government’s reluctance to decentralize spending powers to local
governments after a crisis. In contrast, fiscal decentralization from the revenue side would be more
“flexible” (in the sense of reversing the recentralization trend after some time) considering that
local governments need to cover their needs even after a crisis, and therefore could envisage other
venues to fundraising. The graphs in Figure 5 show the effects of “shock” in a determinate type of
crisis on the level of decentralization over time.
It is important to mention that, in line with our results from the OLS and fixed-effects
models, the shock from domestic debt crisis seems to be to the reverse of the results with the other
types of crisis (that is, implying a movement towards greater decentralization). As we mentioned
above, this result may be explained by the central government’s objective of strengthening the
revenue raising powers of local management to avoid future crises.
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Figure 5: Impulse-Response Functions According to Different Types of Crisis
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DOMESTIC DEBT CRISIS
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CRISIS DUMMY
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6. Robustness Checks
6.1 Exploring Heterogenous Effects by Income
Do the effects of crises differ by the level of country development? We split the sample
between low, middle, and high-income countries according to the OECD classification in order to
examine potential heterogeneous effects. In particular, it is possible that countries in one group
that are more prone to decentralization reforms are also more vulnerable to a certain (or most) type
of crises. Alternately, it may be the effects vary by how recent decentralization reforms are, as in
the case of many developing countries vis-à-vis more established and flexible decentralized
institutions in developed countries. The estimation results from applying this sample split are
shown in Table 5. We can see that the results for middle- and high-income countries are stronger
(in a statistical sense) than for low-income countries. These results may be related to the strength
of the shocks or for institutional design reasons. In the case of the former, lower-income countries
may be less vulnerable to some types of crises, such as capital market-type crises, because they
are less intertwined with global capital markets. From an institutional perspective, more recent
developments of decentralization may be more difficult to reverse or adjust. However, we can also
see that middle-income countries are much more affected than high-income countries. This latter
may be due to better regulations and coping mechanisms by higher-income countries (with the
26

exception of banking crises).

Crisis
type
Currency
Inflation
Stock
Domestic
debt
Foreign
debt
Banking
Crisis
episodes
Crisis
dummy

Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects (Regarding Income Level) from the IV Model
Exp.
0.0122
0.0088
0.0005

Low Income
Middle Income
F-test Rev. F-test
Exp.
F-test Rev.
19.804 0.0100 44.269 -0.0230
8.913 0.0054
30.265 0.0092 54.098 -0.0829*** 13.352 -0.0034
3.224 0.0331 1.650 -0.2200
0.497 -0.0316

F-test
Exp.
10.561 -0.0786
17.149 0.2496
0.628 -0.0177

High Income
F-test Rev.
1.932 -0.1231
0.744 0.3192
0.665 0.2163

F-test
1.516
0.849
0.802

0.0000 .

0.0000 .

-1.4426

0.502

-0.3151 0.505

-6.2089

0.316 0.0000

.

-0.0100 1.865

-0.0242 3.158

-0.2053*** 5.956

0.0069 7.603

-1.7019

1.603 -0.6153

0.952

-0.0144 4.338

0.0003 5.134

-0.1612*** 2.389

0.0024 2.544

-0.1880** 1.553 -0.2053** 2.181

0.0029 11.071 0.0034 14.202 -0.0318*** 12.190 0.0004 16.095 -0.2749

0.456 -0.1882

0.0292 4.092

0.545 -0.3616* 1.032

0.0024 3.062

-0.0882*** 9.186

0.0045 11.671 -0.3981

0.620

6.2 A Different Measure of Decentralization Level
As a last robustness check we use a different data set to measure decentralization.
Specifically, we approximate the decentralization “level” of the countries in our sample with the
Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe et al., 2016). The RAI measures the authority exercised
by regional governments within countries. The latest release of the data expands geographical
coverage to 96 countries (including China, India, Pakistan), extends the time period from 1950
through 2018, and also covers metropolitan regions. The RAI includes five dimensions of selfrule: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and representation;
and also five dimensions of shared rule: law making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing
control, and constitutional reform. Results of the regressions using the RAI as a dependent
variable (and still considering the exchange regime variable as the instrumental variable) are
shown in Table 6.
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Table 6. Results from the RAI Variable to Measure Decentralization
Currency crisis
Inflation crisis
Stock market crisis
Domestic debt crisis
External debt crisis
Banking crisis
Crisis episodes
Crisis dummy

Exchange Regime Instrument (Standard Error)
-2.3702*
(1.2906)
-1.5651*
(0.8342)
35.4637
(99.4221)
-3.6931
(2.2668)
-16.3887
(12.2786)
-2.0979*
(1.1785)
-0.5699**
(0.2885)
-2.3128*
(1.2567)

F-stat
25.021
65.140
0.137
10.056
4.217
45.720
65.382
21.774

The results show at least weakly significant negative coefficients for the expected effects
of recentralization in reaction to most types of economic crisis and the F-stats indicate a strong
instrument. Thus, the effect of a currency crisis, an inflation crisis, a domestic debt crisis, a banking
crisis, the number of crisis episodes, and our dummy indicate that the occurrence of a crisis
generates recentralization even when the level of decentralization is measured from a broader
perspective (the RAI variable).
7. Conclusions
Over the years, the literature on decentralization and fiscal federalism has paid a lot of
attention to the determinants and impact of decentralization processes. However, even though it is
often observed, the literature has paid much less attention to why countries that have decentralized
reverse that process and proceed to recentralize along fiscal and political dimensions. In this paper,
we examine the potential role of economic crises on recentralization processes.
Our main finding is that economic stability indeed plays a key role in fiscal and political
decentralization process. In the face of financial and economic shocks, when revenues are reduced
and expenditures are also under pressure to be cut, we find that most countries decide to gather
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fiscal resources at the central level, as well as take away previously devolved powers and centralize
political institutions.
Using data for 75 countries covering a period of four decades (1970 to 2010), we examine
the effects of different types of economic crisis on fiscal and political decentralization. We find
strong evidence that several types of economic crises lead to fiscal recentralization. However, in
the case of domestic borrowing crises, the effect is further revenue decentralization, probably
reflecting the central government’s willingness to further empower subnational governments with
greater revenue autonomy to avoid a similar crisis in the future. In addition, we explore the effects
of economic crisis on political decentralization and find that they are concordant to those for fiscal
decentralization. This alignment of effects along political and fiscal dimensions of subnational
autonomy underlines the system-wide structural nature of the recentralization response. It is also
significant that the economic crises end up triggering more permanent, rather than just transitory,
changes in the level of decentralization, at least from the perspective of fiscal decentralization
measured from the expenditure side. This pattern is especially present in the cases of inflation and
banking crises and less clear but still present in the cases of currency and external debt crisis. These
main findings are robust to different specifications, estimation methods, and measurements of
decentralization.
With virtually the entire world having recently experienced an economic crisis associated
with the COVID-19 pandemic and the hard policy coordination issues that have consequently
appeared in many multi-level governance systems, it will be interesting to see in the coming years
whether these types of crises also lead to recentralization processes along fiscal and political
dimensions.
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